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DRUNK DRIVING AND DEPORTATION—
SHOULD DUI CONVICTIONS BE TREATED AS 
CRIMES OF VIOLENCE FOR INS REMOVAL 
PURPOSES? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Drunk driving poses serious social problems in the United States.1 In an 
attempt to combat this problem, several circuit courts have ruled that aliens 
convicted of multiple drunk driving offenses should be deported while other 
circuits have disagreed, allowing aliens with drunk driving convictions to 
remain in the U.S.2 As a result of this circuit split, sentencing aliens with 
multiple drunk driving convictions has become unnecessarily difficult, 
confusing, and unfair. 
According to U.S. immigration law, if an alien commits an aggravated 
felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1227,3 he or she can be removed from the United 
States.4 An aggravated felony is “a crime of violence for which the term of 
imprisonment is at least one year.”5 18 U.S.C. § 16 defines a crime of 
violence as: 
a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of 
another, or 
b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a 
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of 
another may be used in the course of committing the offense.6 
Classifying drunk driving convictions as crimes of violence for 
immigration purposes has serious implications for many unsuspecting 
 1. See David L. Marcus, Three Times and Out—Some Face Deportation for Repeat Drunken 
Driving, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 14, 1998, at A1. 
 2. See Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Parsons, 955 F.2d 858 
(3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 2001); Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 
F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2001); Park v. INS, 252 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Trinidad-
Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001); Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2001); Le v. 
U.S. Attorney General, 196 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 3. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2001). 
 4. “Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is 
deportable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2001). 
 5. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2001). 
 6. 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2001). 
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immigrants and their families.7 David Balderamma,8 a Mexican immigrant, 
moved to America, worked hard, and then retired. He expected to spend the 
rest of his life with his family.9 Unfortunately, Balderrama also drove drunk 
on several occasions.10 After Balderrama’s third conviction, the United States 
Immigration Service raided11 his home and informed him that he would be 
deported to Mexico.12 In protesting his client’s imminent deportation, Albert 
Armandariz Jr., Balderrama’s attorney, argued that the “DWI rule punishes 
those who have already paid fines and gone through court-ordered 
rehabilitation programs. The deportations will needlessly break apart families 
and leave fatherless children with no option but welfare.”13 Countering 
Armandariz’s argument, Dale Chavez, administrator of the Mothers Against 
Drunk Driving (MADD) chapter in El Paso responded, “if someone is 
deported, his family still has the opportunity to get together, even if it’s in 
 7. See Three Times and Out—Some Face Deportation for Repeat Drunken Driving, supra note 
1; Frank Trejo, Future Depends on Ruling: Deportations for 3 DWIs May be Halted, THE DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 19, 2002, at 13A. Like Balderrama, Rosario Hernandez, a legal U.S. resident 
faces deportation for his three drunk driving convictions, the last of which occurred in 1994. Id. After 
pleading guilty following his third DWI arrest, the court ordered Mr. Hernandez to attend Alcoholics 
Anonymous meetings. Id. Hernandez is married to a U.S. born citizen with whom he has a four-month 
old son. Id. According to Hernandez, if he were deported, “our whole lives would be destroyed.” Id. 
Facing the prospect of deportation, Mr. Hernandez says, “I know I made mistakes. But I feel I have 
paid for those mistakes and I have learned from them. If I am deported, I will lose everything, 
including my family. My wife is American. There is no reason why she would leave her country and 
go to Mexico. Even I no longer have anything in Mexico.” Id.  
 8. See Three Times and Out—Some Face Deportation for Repeat Drunken Driving, supra note 
1. In 1956, David Balderrama and his wife, Marina, along with their daughter Lucy, relocated to Texas 
from Mexico, their country of origin. Id. Once in the United States, they became legal U.S. residents. 
Id. 
 9. Id. Balderrama worked in a sheet metal factory during the day and then performed home 
repairs after finishing his 8-hour factory shift. Id. 
 10. Id. Between 1993 and 1998, Balderrama was arrested three times for drunk driving. 
Following each of his arrests, he pleaded guilty. Id. According to his family, “if he had known the 
three [guilty] pleas would haunt him in his old age, he might have requested a jury trial.” Id. Because 
the decision to deport applies retroactively, Mark Cohen, an immigration lawyer, argues, “[m]any, if 
not most, of the immigrants affected entered into plea arrangements when federal immigration law 
defined conviction and aggravated felony differently. Had they known that pleading guilty or taking a 
deferred adjudication on a third DWI was going to render them arguably deportable, they probably 
would have made a different decision. The retroactive application . . . of the law to these individuals 
violates basic notions of fairness inherent to our Constitution, and specifically may violate their due 
process and equal protection rights.” Frank Trejo, 2 Groups Defend DWI Deportations—INS, MADD 
Say Effort Necessary; Critics Call Actions Anti-Immigrant, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 4, 
1998, at 33A. 
 11. Law enforcement agents referred to the raid, which occurred throughout the state of Texas, as 
Operation Last Call. Id. When the agents entered Balderrama’s home, they were brandishing weapons. 
Id. When asked about the raid, Balderrama stated, “I’m not an outlaw. If they want to throw me out of 
the country, I won’t fight them. But they don’t have to storm my house and scare my family.” Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
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another land. But if he kills somebody, then the victim’s family can only get 
together at the graveyard.”14 
Although the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision in United States v. 
Chapa-Garza changed Texas law regarding the deportation of aliens with 
multiple drunk driving convictions,15 Balderrama’s experience and the 
experiences of other immigrants throughout the nation indicate that repeat 
drunk driving convictions have serious and often unexpected implications for 
immigrants and their families.16 When an alien is deported, he must abandon 
his family, frequently leaving them unable to support themselves.17 As a 
result, the remaining family members often must rely on government 
subsidies, including welfare, for survival. With limited financial resources, it 
will be virtually impossible for the family to travel to visit their deported 
family member, which will negatively affect their family relationships.18 
Because most aliens flee their native countries to escape substandard living 
conditions or political strife, it may be unsafe or unwise for them to return to 
their homeland. In extreme cases, deported aliens cannot return to their 
country of origin because the region is plagued by political instability. As a 
result, they may be sent to another country with which they have no ties. 
Therefore, resolving the conflict over whether drunk driving should be 
treated as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16 must not only be 
accomplished quickly, but also with compassion for those whose lives it will 
dramatically and irrevocably affect. 
The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals are split as to whether drunk 
driving constitutes a crime of violence under § 16.19 Persuaded by the 
 14. Id. 
 15. Because, under Chapa-Garza, drunk driving no longer constitutes a crime of violence, 
neither Balderrama nor Hernandez are at further risk for deportation. 243 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 2001). 
However, because both the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits still hold that drunk driving is a crime of 
violence, immigrants in the same position as Balderrama and Hernandez who drive drunk in those 
jurisdictions still face deportation. See infra Part II.b.2 and accompanying notes. 
 16. See Three Times and Out—Some Face Deportation for Repeat Drunken Driving, supra note 
1. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Dalton, 257 F.3d at 200 (holding under New York law, drunk driving does not require 
the use of physical force and thus does not constitute a crime of violence); Parsons, 955 F.2d at 858 
(stating in dicta, 18 U.S.C. § 16 does not necessarily apply to negligent or criminal acts that result in 
injury.); Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 921 (driving while intoxicated is not a crime of violence under 18 
U.S.C. § 16); Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 600 (driving under the influence is not a crime of violence 
under 18 U.S.C. § 16 because defendant had no intent to use violent force); Park, 252 F.3d at 1018 
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that reckless mens rea sufficient to constitute a crime of violence under 18 
U.S.C. § 16); Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1140 (holding the “use . . . against” requirement in 18 
U.S.C. § 16 means that a defendant cannot commit a “crime of violence” if he negligently hits 
someone or something with a physical object and thus drunk driving does not constitute a crime of 
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argument that a crime of violence requires the intentional use of force, the 
Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have held 
that driving while intoxicated is not a crime of violence because it does not 
involve the use of intentional force.20 Conversely, the Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuit Courts of Appeals have read the statute as requiring a reckless mens 
rea, not the intentional use of force, and have held drunk driving to be a 
crime of violence.21 Recently, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)22 
changed its position on the crime of violence issue.23 According to the BIA’s 
decision in In re Luis Manuel Ramos, if a federal circuit court of appeals has 
ruled on the issue, the BIA should follow the rule of that circuit.24 However, 
if the circuit has not yet resolved the issue, the BIA should classify offenses 
committed recklessly that involve a substantial risk that force would be used 
as crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16 and, thus, an aggravated felony 
for removal purposes under § 1227.25 
violence for deportation purposes); Tapia Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1216 (driving under the influence is a 
crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16); Le, 196 F.3d at 1352 (driving under the influence with 
serious bodily injury constitutes a crime of violence). 
 20. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 21. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 22. In conjunction with the State Department, the Labor Department and the Department of 
Health & Human Services, the United States Justice Department plays a major role in administering 
the Immigration and Nationality Act. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND 
POLICY 1-2 (2d ed. 1997). The Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), part of the Justice 
Department, enforces the law, inspects arriving immigrants, prosecutes at administrative hearings, 
processes and adjudicates certain applications, and educates the public. Id. at 1. Separate from the INS 
although also a part of the Justice Department, the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) 
deals solely with adjudication. The EOIR has three parts: (1) the Office of the Chief Immigration 
Judge, which coordinates the work of immigration judges in presiding over removal hearings, (2) the 
Board of Immigration Appeals, which hears appeals from both immigration judges and certain INS 
proceedings, and (3) the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer, which conducts 
evidentiary hearings in cases involving the employment of unauthorized aliens and certain forms of 
employment discrimination. Id. at 1. 
 23. In re Luis Manuel Ramos, Interim Decision 3468, 2002 WL 1001049 (BIA, Apr. 4, 2002) 
(holding that in circuits where the federal court of appeals has not resolved the crime of violence issue, 
an offense will be considered a crime of violence if it is committed recklessly and involves a 
substantial risk that the perpetrator may use force in carrying out the crime; however, in circuits where 
the issue has been adjudicated, the law of that circuit should be applied). Previously, the BIA applied 
different rules in different jurisdictions, following no discernible pattern. See In re Magallanes-Garcia, 
Interim Decision 3341, 1998 WL 133301 (BIA Mar. 19, 1998), overruled by In re Luis Manuel 
Ramos, Interim Decision 3468, 2002 WL 1001049 (BIA, Apr. 4, 2002) (concluding that the nature of 
drunk driving presents a risk that physical force would be used against another and, as a result, it 
constitutes a crime of violence for deportation purposes); In re Puente-Salazar, Interim Decision 3412, 
1999 WL 770709 (BIA Sept. 29, 1999) , overruled by In re Luis Manuel Ramos, Interim Decision 
3468, 2002 WL 1001049 (BIA, Apr. 4, 2002) (operating a vehicle while under the influence 
constitutes a crime of violence because the nature of the crime creates a substantial risk that physical 
force will be applied). 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. 
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Although the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have determined that drunk 
driving does constitute a crime of violence, the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, 
and Ninth Circuits have held that drunk driving does not qualify as a crime of 
violence for deportation purposes.26 Thus, under the BIA’s current approach, 
an alien who lives within the jurisdiction of the Tenth Circuit will likely be 
deported while an alien convicted of drunk driving in the Third Circuit will 
be allowed to remain in the United States.27 Because deportation decisions 
should not be made on the basis of geography, the split among the circuits 
must be resolved. 
II. HISTORY 
A. The Statutes 
In 1988, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act28 first used the term “aggravated 
felony” in relation to the Immigration and Nationality Act.29 With the 
promulgation of 8 U.S.C. § 1227, which provides that “any alien who is 
convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable,” 
commission of an aggravated felony became grounds for an alien’s 
deportation or removal.30 As defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101,31 an aggravated 
felony is “a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of Title 18) for which 
the term of imprisonment is at least one year.”32 Therefore, if courts treat 
drunk driving as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16, drunk driving 
would constitute an aggravated felony for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1227.33 
 26. See supra note 19. 
 27. Luis Manuel Ramos, 2002 WL 1001049, at *1. 
 28. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (currently 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (Supp. III 1991)). 
 29. The Immigration and Nationality Act has been codified as 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557. 
 30. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2001). 
 31. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) includes a list of 21 categories of aggravated offenses, including the 
murder, rape or sexual abuse of a minor, illicit trafficking in a controlled substance, illicit trafficking in 
firearms or destructive devices, money laundering, a crime of violence, a theft or burglary offense, the 
demand of ransom, child pornography, racketeering, owning or controlling a prostitution business, 
transmitting national defense information, fraud, smuggling, counterfeiting, failure to appear to serve a 
sentence, obstructing justice, failing to appear pursuant to a court order, and conspiracy. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
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B. The Cases 
1. Drunk Driving—Not a Crime of Violence 
When asked to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 16, the circuits have split as to 
whether drunk driving constitutes a crime of violence.34 The Second, Third, 
Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits, believing a crime of violence requires the 
intentional use of force, have held that drunk driving does not constitute a 
crime of violence under § 16 because it does not involve the use of 
intentional force.35 
In Dalton v. Ashcroft,36 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
considered whether Thomas Dalton, a Canadian citizen and lawful U.S. 
resident,37 committed an aggravated felony when he violated New York law 
(the “New York statute”) by operating a vehicle while intoxicated and 
therefore was deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227.38 The court believed that a 
crime of violence should be analyzed using the categorical approach,39 which 
requires an examination of the “intrinsic nature of the offense rather than . . . 
the factual circumstances surrounding [a] violation.”40 In analyzing the New 
York statute,41 the court stated that the DWI offense does not require the use 
 34. See Dalton, 257 F.3d at 200; Parsons, 955 F.2d at 858; Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 921; 
Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 600; Park, 252 F.3d at 1018; Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1140; Tapia 
Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1216; Le, 196 F.3d 1352. 
 35. Dalton, 257 F.3d at 200; Parsons, 955 F.2d at 858; Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 921; Bazan-
Reyes, 256 F.3d at 600; Park, 252 F.3d at 1018; Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1140. 
 36. 257 F.3d at 200.  
 37. Dalton, who was born in Canada, had been living in the U.S. as a lawful resident since 1958. 
Dalton, 257 F.3d at 202. 
 38. While Dalton was serving the prison sentence, the INS began removal proceedings against 
him. The INS charged that he was removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227 because he had convicted of an 
aggravated felony. Id. at 203. Following a removal hearing, the Immigration Judge ordered Dalton to 
be sent back to Canada. Id. Dalton appealed and the BIA affirmed. Id. 
 39. Under the categorical approach to statutory interpretation, “the singular circumstances of an 
individual petitioner’s crimes should not be considered, and only the minimum criminal conduct 
necessary to sustain a conviction under a given statute is relevant.” Id. at 204. Furthermore, “any 
conduct falling within the purview of the statute must by its nature entail moral turpitude.” Id. 
 40. Id. The court stated: 
Based upon the language of the statute requiring analysis of the “nature” of the crime, as well as 
by analogy to the Circuit’s law regarding moral turpitude, we believe that the categorical approach 
is appropriate for determining whether an offense is a crime of violence under § 16(b) in the 
context of deportation proceedings. Furthermore, the categorical approach is especially 
appropriate in the current context where the relevant facts may be up to ten years old and may 
never have been developed in the trial court. 
Id. at 204-05. 
 41. The statute, NYVTL § 1192.3, states “[n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle while in an 
intoxicated condition.” Id. at 205. A person could conceivably be convicted under the statute “even 
where there is no risk that force may be used or . . . injury might result.” Id. 
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of physical force.42 The court focused on the notion of an accident as 
involving the use of physical force and differentiated the risk of force from 
the risk of injury.43 Holding that drunk driving does not constitute a crime of 
violence, the court recognized the inherent societal dangers posed by drunk 
drivers, stating “nothing in our decision today in any way underestimates the 
toll that drunk driving has taken on human life; it is an urgent, nationwide 
problem of staggering proportion.”44 
In United States v. Parsons,45 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
addressed the definition of a crime of violence under the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG”). In dicta, the court stated that 18 U.S.C. 
§ 16 does not necessarily apply to negligent or criminal acts that result in 
injury.46 The court’s statement indicates that driving while intoxicated should 
not be treated as a crime of violence because there is no risk of committing a 
specific intent crime.47 Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit in Chapa-Garza and 
the Seventh Circuit in Bazan-Reyes followed the Parsons reasoning and held 
that committing the crime of drunk driving does not involve the formation of 
intent necessary to commit a crime of violence.48 
In United States v. Chapa-Garza,49 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
addressed whether Texas felony DWI constitutes a crime of violence.50 After 
 42. Id. at 205. 
 43. Id. at 206. According to the court, “[a]lthough an accident may . . . be said to use force, one 
cannot be said to use force in an accident as one might use force to pry open a heavy . . . door.” Id.  
 44. Id. Additionally, the court indicated that “shoehorning such reprehensible conduct into 
criminal statutes that were not designed to hold it . . . risk[s] an equivalent harm of usurping federal 
and state legislative roles.” Id. 
 45. 955 F.2d at 858. Parsons, a repeat offender, pled guilty to possession with the intent to 
distribute cocaine base. Id. at 861. Expanding the congressional definition of a crime of violence under 
the career offender sentencing guideline to include actual, attempted, or threatened use of physical 
force directly against persons or crimes aimed at seeking or damaging property, the court sentenced 
the defendant as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Id. at 874. In reaching its decision, the 
court further stated: 
[C]rimes such as drunk driving and child neglect present a serious risk of physical harm to a 
victim and therefore qualify as predicate “crimes of violence” for purposes of the career offender 
Guideline. We are concerned by the possibility that a defendant could be deemed a career violent 
offender on the basis of two such convictions, even when he or she never intended harm, nor was 
there a substantial risk that he or she would have to use intentional force . . . we urge that the 
[Sentencing] Commission reconsider its career offender Guidelines to the extent that they cover 
such “pure recklessness” crimes. 
Id. 
 46. Id. at 866. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 921; Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 600. 
 49. 243 F.3d at 921. 
 50. Id. at 923. In Chapa-Garza, the defendants had all pled guilty to violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) 
by unlawfully remaining in the United States after having been deported. Id. The United States 
Sentencing Guidelines provides a base offense level of eight (8) for violations of § 1326. Id. However, 
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examining the Texas statute,51 the court determined that, according to Texas 
law, driving while intoxicated is not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16 
because the “substantial risk” language in 18 U.S.C. § 16 “refers only to 
those offenses involving a substantial likelihood that the perpetrator will 
intentionally employ physical force.”52 According to the court, “while the 
victim of a drunk driver may sustain physical injury from physical force 
being applied to his body as a result of collision with the drunk driver’s 
errant automobile . . . it is clear that such force has not been intentionally 
used against the other person at all, much less in order to perpetrate any 
crime, including the crime of felony DWI.”53 Therefore, the court stated that 
while a defendant may intentionally drive while intoxicated and, as a result, 
cause an accident, he does not do so with intent to use physical force to cause 
an injury to another. Without the requisite intent, the perpetrator’s actions do 
not satisfy the 18 U.S.C. § 16 definition of a crime of violence, and thus he 
cannot be convicted of an aggravated felony.54 Chapa-Garza, a seminal 
decision, essentially defined the conflict between the circuits in addressing 
the definition of a crime of violence.55 
if § 1326 violators were removed because of an aggravated felony conviction, the base level increases 
sixteen (16) offense levels. Id. Because the defendants had all been convicted of felony DWI, the court 
had to determine whether the crime constituted a crime of violence, thereby warranting a stiffer 
punishment under the USSG. Id. at 924. 
 51. In analyzing § 16, the court, like the Second Circuit in Dalton, applied the categorical 
approach, stating “[t]he proper inquiry is whether a particular defined offense, in the abstract is a crime 
of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).” Id. at 924. 
 52. Id. at 926. Furthermore, “[t]he criterion that the defendant use physical force against the 
person or property of another is most reasonably read to refer to intentional conduct, not an accidental, 
unintended event.” Id. 
 53. Id. at 927. The court further elaborated:  
The crime of Texas felony DWI is committed when the defendant, after two prior DWI 
convictions, begins operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Intentional force against another’s 
person or property is virtually never employed to commit this offense.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
 54. After the Chapa-Garza decision, the INS issued a statement, noting that the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision conflicted with the BIA’s decision in In re Magallenes-Garcia, which held an alien could be 
removed for a felony DWI conviction. Such a conviction constituted a crime of violence and thus an 
aggravated felony warranting removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227. 78 No.10 INTERPRETER RELEASES 489 
(Mar. 12, 2001). According to the statement: “INS is examining the applicability of the Fifth 
Circuit[’s] . . . removal decisions and awaiting a determination by the Department of Justice whether 
or not to seek further review of the decision.” Id. Furthermore, the INS indicated that it would 
“[c]ontinue removing aliens convicted of multiple drunk driving offense, notwithstanding the Chapa-
Garza ruling.” Id. 
 55. Courts both in and outside of the Fifth Circuit frequently cite Chapa-Garza for its well-
reasoned analysis of the crime of violence issue. In United States v. Hernandez-Neave, 2001 WL 
1643945, the Fifth Circuit addressed whether a defendant’s prior conviction for unlawfully carrying a 
firearm in a place licensed to sell alcohol constitutes a crime of violence. Salvador Hernandez-Neave, 
a foreign national, was in the United States illegally. Id. at 1. Although Hernandez-Neave had been 
deported in 1998, he illegally reentered the U.S. in 1999 and was again apprehended. Id. While in the 
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In Bazan-Reyes v. INS,56 the Seventh Circuit addressed a case where the 
petitioners, Jose Bazan-Reyes,57 Wincenty Maciasowicz58 and Arnoldo 
Gomez-Vela,59 sought review of INS and BIA decisions60 ordering them 
removed due to their state DWI convictions.61 After reviewing its decision in 
United States v. Rutherford,62 the court stated that like the language of the 
United States originally, he had been convicted in 1984 of carrying a firearm in an establishment 
licensed to sell alcoholic beverages and in 1993 for driving while intoxicated. Id. At Hernandez-
Neave’s arraignment for illegally reentering the United States, the government asked for a conviction 
“[w]ith sentencing guideline offense level increases consonant with a prior aggravated felony.” Id. 
Under the sentencing guidelines, the court can only apply the sixteen-level increase requested by the 
government if one of the defendant’s prior convictions constitutes a crime of violence. Id. Following 
its holding in Chapa-Garza, the Fifth Circuit held that Hernandez-Neave’s DWI conviction did not 
constitute a crime of violence. Id. at 3. As for the firearm conviction, the court relied on the reasoning 
of Chapa-Garza, stating: 
Under [the] categorical approach to determining crimes of violence, we do not look to either 
possible physical violence nor to any particular conduct by a defendant, violent or otherwise. The 
inquiry is simply into the nature of the crime. In the case of unlawfully carrying a firearm onto 
premises licensed for the sale of alcoholic beverages, physical force against the person or property 
of another need not be used to complete the crime. Simply stepping over the threshold while 
carrying such a weapon completes the crime. 
Id. Ultimately, the court held that the firearm charge did not constitute a crime of violence and 
remanded the case for resentencing. Id. 
 56. 256 F.3d at 600. 
 57. In 1972, Bazan-Reyes, a Mexican citizen, came to the United States. Id. at 602. In 1988, he 
applied for temporary resident alien status, but because he failed to provide information about his 
criminal record, which included four (4) DWI convictions, the INS denied his application. Id. After 
another conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated in 1999, the INS commenced removal 
proceedings against him, arguing that his DWI conviction constituted a crime of violence. Id. at 602-
03. 
 58. A Polish citizen, Maciasowicz was admitted as a permanent U.S. resident in 1993. Id. at 603. 
Five years later he pled guilty to two counts of vehicular homicide. Id. Shortly thereafter, the BIA 
found that “homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle under Wisconsin [s]tatute . . . [constituted] an 
aggravated felony and ordered [him] removed . . .” Id. 
 59. In 1971, Gomez-Vela, a Mexican resident, was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent 
resident. Id. In 1997, he was arrested for driving under the influence and, because he had two previous 
DUI convictions, he was charged with aggravated DUI. Id. After Gomez-Vela pled guilty and was 
sentenced to twenty-six months in prison, the INS commenced removal proceedings against him. Id. at 
604. The Immigration Judge found that “aggravated driving under the influence is a crime of violence 
as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), and therefore is an aggravated felony.” Id. As a result of his 
convictions, Gomez-Vela was ordered removed. Id. 
 60. According to the BIA, § 16(b) crimes of violence are not “[l]imited to crimes of specific 
intent, but . . . include . . . offenses that involve reckless (and possibly negligent) behavior.” Id. at 606. 
On appeal, the petitioners argued that § 6(a) “requires intentional force” while § 16(b) “requires a 
substantial risk of intentional force.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 61. Id. at 602.  
 62. 54 F.3d 370 (7th Cir. 1995). In Rutherford, the court examined whether a conviction for 
causing serious bodily injury while driving under the influence constituted a crime of violence for 
U.S.S.G. purposes. Id. The court held that the phrase “use of physical force” in the U.S.S.G. means “an 
intentional act rather than the mere application or exertion of force.” Id. at 372-73. The court further 
stated that: 
Force is exerted in many instances where it is not employed for any particular purpose. For 
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United States Sentencing Guidelines, the phrase “may be used” in § 16(b) 
contains an intent requirement. This phrase requires that the physical force 
used to commit the offense be accompanied by intent to use that force.63 
Furthermore, according to the court, “the fact that the petitioners did employ 
intentional force at some point, in opening the car door or pressing the 
accelerator for example, does not constitute the use of physical force as 
required by the statute.”64 In analyzing 18 U.S.C. § 16, the court stated that 
the statutory language “simply does not support a finding that a risk that one 
object will apply force to another is enough to constitute a crime of violence 
under the statute.”65 Ultimately, the court held that the crimes of driving 
while intoxicated under Indiana law, homicide by the intoxicated use of a 
vehicle under Wisconsin law, and aggravated driving under the influence 
under Illinois law do not constitute “crimes of violence” and thus do not 
support removal because they do not normally require the use of intentional 
force.66 Recognizing the severity of drunk driving related crimes, the court 
stated, “our decision today does not minimize the seriousness of crimes 
involving drunk driving. There is no question that drunk driving ‘exacts a 
high societal toll in the forms of death, injury and property damage.’ [T]his 
fact does not . . . change our observation in Rutherford that ‘a drunk driving 
accident is not the result of plan, direction or purpose, but of recklessness at 
worst and misfortune at best.’”67 
The Ninth Circuit has decided two cases dealing with issues related to 
drunk driving and crimes of violence, Park v. INS68 and United States v. 
Trinidad-Aquino.69 In Park v. INS,70 the Ninth Circuit addressed whether an 
alien’s conviction for involuntary manslaughter constituted a crime of 
violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16, thus rendering the alien deportable for the 
example, earthquakes and avalanches involve the exertion of a tremendous amount of force . . . 
Referring to a randomly occurring avalanche as a “use” of force would torture the English 
language . . . A drunk driver who injures a pedestrian would not describe the incident by saying he 
“used” his car to hurt someone. In ordinary English, the word “use” implies intentional availment. 
No availment of force in order to achieve an end is present in a drunk driving accident. 
Id. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. The court identified the dilemma inherent in holding that drunk driving does constitute a 
crime of violence under § 16(b), stating if drunk driving were a crime of violence under 16(b), 
“[a]lmost any felony offense that involves a substantial risk of physical harm, accidental or otherwise, 
would be a crime of violence under § 16(b) because physical harm is nearly always the result of some 
type of physical force.” Id. at 372. 
 67. Id. at 372 (quoting In re Magallenes, Interim Decision 3341, 1998 WL 133301 (BIA 1998)). 
 68. 252 F.3d at 1018.  
 69. 259 F.3d at 1140.  
 
 70. 252 F.3d at 1018. 
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commission of an aggravated felony.71 On appeal, Park argued that 
involuntary manslaughter did not constitute a crime of violence and thus was 
not a deportable offense.72 In analyzing the issue, the Ninth Circuit used the 
categorical approach, assessing whether “the full range of conduct 
encompassed by [the statute] . . . constituted an aggravated felony.”73 
Contrary to the Second, Third, Fifth and Seventh Circuits, which interpreted 
§ 16 to require the intentional use of physical force,74 the Ninth Circuit 
interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 16 to require only a reckless mens rea in the 
involuntary manslaughter context.75 After determining that the alien’s 
involuntary manslaughter conviction qualified as a crime of violence, the 
court concluded the conviction constituted an aggravated felony, rendering 
the alien deportable.76 
In another recent opinion, United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, the Ninth 
Circuit held that drunk driving does not constitute a crime of violence for 
USSG purposes.77 However, in reaching its decision, the court examined 
whether a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol with injury to 
another constitutes a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16.78 According to 
the court, if Trinidad-Acquino could have been convicted under the DUI 
statute without committing an aggravated felony, the district court’s decision 
would be correct.79 Because the court believed that the “definition of crime 
of violence found at § 16 contains a volitional requirement absent from 
 71. Park, a South Korean citizen and native, came to the United States in December 1983 on a 
student visa. 252 F.3d at 1020. She received a theology degree from California Union College and a 
master’s degree from Linda Vista Baptist Bible College & Seminary. Id. In 1996, she pled guilty to 
and was subsequently convicted of involuntary manslaughter for her role in the beating death of a 
young woman during an exorcism. Id. After she was taken into custody, the INS began removal 
proceedings and ultimately ordered her deported. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1021. 
 74. See supra note 19. 
 75. Park, 252 F.3d at 1025. However, the court clarified that they did not intend to “hold that 
every crime in which recklessness or criminal negligence is the mens rea necessarily qualifies as a 
‘crime of violence’ within the meaning of § 16(b) . . . however, the crime at issue here requires a 
sufficiently culpable mens rea to qualify . . . and, in this context, an intentional use of physical force is 
not required.” Id. (emphasis in original). 
 76. Id. at 1025.  
 77. 259 F.3d at 1140.  
 78. Id. at 1142. The defendant, Trinidad-Acquino, pled guilty to illegally re-entering the United 
States following his deportation for driving under the influence with bodily injury. Id. The Sentencing 
Guidelines provide for a sixteen-level base increase if the defendant was originally deported for an 
aggravated felony. Id. Because it believed that Trinidad-Acquino’s conviction for driving while 
intoxicated required merely a negligent mens rea and was thus not an aggravated felony, the district 
court sentenced him to twenty-one months in prison, the maximum available at the unadjusted base 
sentencing level. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1143. 
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negligence,”80 the court stated that “it does not make sense to say that [a] 
person is volitionally using physical force against someone or something 
when he neither intended to hit the person or thing nor consciously 
disregarded the risk that he might do so.”81 Holding that “the presence of the 
volitional ‘use . . . against’ requirement in both prongs of 18 U.S.C. § 16 
means that a defendant cannot commit a crime of violence if he negligently 
rather than intentionally or recklessly hits someone or something with a 
physical object,” the court found that felony DUI does not constitute a “crime 
of violence” in applying the United States Sentencing Guidelines.82 In 
reaching its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit also stated that the Trinidad-
Acquino holding did not conflict with Park v. INS because “Park’s assertion 
that an intentional use of physical force is not required is perfectly 
compatible with our analysis . . . [that] crime of violence definitions do not 
require an intentional use of force, but they do require a volitional act. The 
crime need not be committed purposefully or knowingly, but it must be 
committed at least recklessly.”83 In holding that drunk driving lacks the 
requisite intent to constitute a crime of violence, the Ninth Circuit analyzed 
the “use . . . against” language, determining that the language indicated that a 
volitional act was required. Meanwhile, the court criticized the Tenth and 
Eleventh Circuits for reaching the conclusion that crimes committed with a 
negligent mens rea can be “crimes of violence” without even addressing the 
“use . . . against” language.84 
2. Drunk Driving as a Crime of Violence 
Conversely, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have interpreted § 16 to 
require a reckless mens rea, and consequently have held drunk driving to be a 
crime of violence.85 
In Tapia Garcia v. INS,86 the Tenth Circuit examined whether drunk 
driving constituted a crime of violence warranting removal under 8 U.S.C. 
 80. According to the court’s analysis, definitions of “use,” as well as “converting, employing, 
availing oneself of, carrying out a purpose or action, and putting into action or service to attain an end, 
contain a volitional requirement. Under ordinary, contemporary, and common understanding, one 
cannot do any of these things negligently; that is, without some volition to perform the act.” Id. at 
1145.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at 1145-47. 
 83. Id. at 1146. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Tapia Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1216; Le, 196 F.3d at 1352.  
 86. 237 F.3d at 1216.  
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§ 1227.87 On appeal, the alien argued that a conviction under Idaho’s DUI 
statute does not necessarily indicate that a crime of violence has been 
committed because drunk driving does not “by its nature involve a 
substantial risk that physical force . . . may be used in the course of 
committing the offense.”88 Like the circuits finding that drunk driving did not 
constitute a crime of violence, the Tenth Circuit applied the categorical 
approach in analyzing whether a conviction constitutes a crime of violence 
under 18 U.S.C. § 16.89 According to the court, the inherent danger of driving 
under the influence of alcohol lies in the risk of injury from drunk driving, a 
risk that is neither conjectural nor speculative.90 The court further drew a 
parallel between the definition of a crime of violence for immigration and for 
sentencing purposes, holding that the inherent danger present in drunk 
driving supported the conclusion that a DUI offense constituted a crime of 
violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16 because the generic elements of the offense 
present a “substantial risk that physical force may be used.”91 Ultimately, the 
court concluded that Tapia-Garcia’s DUI offense, which it categorized as an 
aggravated felony, constituted a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), 
and ordered him deported under 8 U.S.C. § 1227.”92 
The Eleventh Circuit held that drunk driving constituted a crime of 
violence warranting removal in Le v. U.S. Attorney General.93 Under Florida 
law, driving under the influence has two elements: 
1. The defendant must operate a motor vehicle while under the 
influence and  
 87. Tapia-Garcia, the petitioner, was legally a permanent resident of the United States and a 
citizen of Mexico. Id. at 1217. He was convicted in Idaho for driving under the influence of alcohol. 
Id. After he was convicted, the INS began removal proceedings against him, arguing that he should be 
removed pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227 because his DUI offense constituted a “crime of violence.” Id. 
Following a hearing, the immigration judge concluded that Tapia-Garcia’s DUI offense constituted a 
crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16 and ordered the petitioner removed from the country. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1221.  
 89. Id. at 1221-22. 
 90. Id. at 1222. Specifically, the court stated that “drunk driving is a reckless act that often results 
in injury, and the risks of driving while intoxicated are well known.” Id.  
 91. Id. at 1223. 
 92. Id. at 1223. Although the court determined that Tapia-Garcia was subject to deportation, it 
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Id. 
 93. 196 F.3d at 1352. The petitioner, Duan Le, a citizen of Vietnam, was convicted of two third-
degree felonies including driving under the influence with serious bodily injury and driving with a 
suspended license. Id. at 1353. Following his conviction, the INS began removal proceedings against 
him. Id. The immigration judge ordered Le deported because he had been convicted of an aggravated 
felony. Le appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which affirmed the immigration judge’s 
order. Id. 
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2. As a result of operating the motor vehicle, the defendant caused 
serious bodily injury to another.94 
Therefore, according to the court, serious bodily injury was an element of 
the offense.95 The court stated, “Mr. Le’s conviction for driving under the 
influence with serious bodily injury satisfies the definition of a crime of 
violence under section 16(a) of Title 18 because one element of the offense 
includes the actual use of physical force.”96 Therefore, according to the 
Eleventh Circuit, the crime of driving under the influence, which poses the 
risk of death or serious bodily injury to the defendant as well as innocent 
victims, constitutes a crime of violence as well as an aggravated felony for 
removal purposes.97 
In In re Luis Manuel Ramos,98 the Board of Immigration Appeals99 
clarified its position on the crime of violence issue and overturned two 
previous decisions, In re Magallanes-Garcia100 and In re Puente-Salazar.101 
 94. Id. at 1354. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. 
 98. Luis Manuel Ramos, 2002 WL 1001049, at *1.  
 99. The Board of Immigration Appeals hears appeals based upon removal decisions issued by 
immigration judges throughout the United States. LEGOMSKY, supra note 22, at 540. During the initial 
immigration hearing, the immigration judge hears from the parties, the INS and the alien. Id. At the 
hearing, the alien bears the burden of proving that he or she is lawfully present in the U.S. by clear and 
convincing evidence. Id. at 541. The burden then shifts to the INS to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the alien should be deported. Id. After hearing all the evidence, the immigration judge, 
who resembles but is not an Article III judge, issues an opinion. This opinion is usually given orally 
and is made in the presence of the parties. Id. at 540-41.  
 Once a decision has been entered, either the alien or the INS may appeal to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals. Id. at 542. The Board of Immigration Appeals sits in Falls Church, Virginia. Id. 
It consists of a Chair and fourteen other permanent members. Id. The BIA procedural rules require that 
the appellant file a notice summarizing the grounds for the appeal with the immigration judge who 
made the initial ruling within 30 days of the issuance of the decision. Id. The parties then file detailed 
briefs and have the opportunity to file various motions. Id. Although the BIA has discretion to hold 
oral arguments, this rarely occurs. Id. Because the BIA does not usually hold oral arguments, its 
review is confined to the record. It does, however, have the power to make an independent substitution 
of judgment. Id.  
 Once the BIA has reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs and motions, it issues a written 
opinion binding all immigration judges and, in this particular case, the INS. Id. at 543. If the BIA 
designates the opinion as precedent, it is also binding in similar cases. Id. Ultimately, the Attorney 
General has the power to review decisions issued by the BIA. Id. However, the Attorney General only 
exercises this power when the case deals with a critical legal or political issue. Id.  
 100. Magallanes-Garcia, 1998 WL 133301, at *1. The respondent, Carlos Istalin Magallanes-
Garcia, was lawfully granted permanent residence in the United State in 1989. Id. In 1995, 
Magallanes-Garcia was convicted of aggravated driving under the influence while his license was 
suspended, revoked or in violation of a restriction. Id. Thereafter, an immigration judge found the 
respondent deportable under § 241(a)(2)(a)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and ordered 
him deported back to Mexico. Id. 
 
 In analyzing whether a conviction constitutes a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16, the BIA 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss2/12
p591 Lofton book pages.doc10/27/03   2:57 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2003] DRUNK DRIVING AND DEPORTATION 605 
 
 
 
 
 
First, the BIA generally addressed the crime of violence issue.102 
Specifically, the BIA held that, in circuits that have adjudicated the issue, it 
must follow the law of the circuit, thereby overturning In re Magallanes-
Garcia and In re Puente-Salazar.103 However, in circuits that have yet to 
address the matter, the BIA stated that, to constitute a crime of violence, the 
alien’s criminal conviction must be based on a statute that requires at least 
recklessness and a substantial risk that force would be used in the 
indicated that the statutory requirements for conviction “do not include as an element the use, 
attempted use or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another. 
Accordingly, the respondent’s conviction does not satisfy the test set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 16 (a).” Id.  
 To determine whether the conviction met the § 16(b) requirements, the BIA applied a categorical 
approach. Id. According to the Board of Immigration Appeals, “for the respondent’s crime to fall 
within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), the offense must be one for which the nature of the crime 
involves a substantial risk that physical force may be used against the person or property of another 
during the commission of the offense . . . the crime must have the potential of resulting in harm.” Id. 
The BIA ultimately concluded that the nature of drunk driving is such that it presents a risk that 
physical force would be used against another and, as a result, determined that drunk driving constituted 
a crime of violence for removal purposes. Id. 
 101. Puente-Salazar, 1999 WL 770709, at *1. In Puente-Salazar, the respondent was a native and 
citizen of Mexico who had lawfully entered the U.S. as a permanent resident in 1979. Id. In 1997, he 
was convicted of driving while intoxicated. Id. Shortly thereafter, the INS began removal proceedings 
against him. Id. The Immigration Judge determined that “the record of conviction presented by the 
[INS] supported the allegation regarding the respondent’s DWI conviction . . . the respondent had been 
convicted of an aggravated felony . . . [and] ordered [the respondent] removed from the United States 
to Mexico.” Id. 
 In In re Puente-Salazar, the BIA had to determine whether a conviction for the crime of driving 
while intoxicated under § 49.04 of the Texas Penal Code constituted a crime of violence and therefore 
an aggravated felony. Id. On appeal, the respondent argued that the Texas DWI statute encompassed 
conduct that is less than that required for an aggravated felony. Id. The BIA noted that, because the 
Texas DWI statute does not include as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against the person or property of another, 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) did not apply to this case. Id.  
 In examining whether a Texas DWI constituted a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), the 
BIA applied the categorical approach. Id. The BIA emphasized that a statutory definition of a crime of 
violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16 did not require intentional conduct. Id. Focusing on the nature of the 
crime, the BIA concluded that the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence was a crime 
that “by its nature involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of 
another may be used,” reaffirming its previous determination that drunk driving constituted a crime of 
violence for deportation purposes. Id. Provided that a conviction rises to a felony under state law, the 
court held that a state offense for operating a vehicle while under the influence constituted a crime of 
violence because “the nature of the crime of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may create a 
substantial risk that physical force will be applied.” Id. 
 In reaching its conclusion, the BIA considered both the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Rutherford 
and the Third Circuit’s opinion in Parsons. Id. Regarding Rutherford, the BIA stated, “the court 
concluded that the offense of causing a serious bodily injury when driving while intoxicated does not 
have as an element the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” Id. When the 
Rutherford court made its statement, it was analyzing a USSG that resembled 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). Id. 
However, the BIA conducted its Puente-Salazar analysis under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). Id. As for the Third 
Circuit’s decision in Parsons, the BIA simply stated that the court’s analysis was persuasive. Id. 
 102. Luis Manuel Ramos, 2002 WL 1001049, at *1. 
 103. Id. 
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commission of the crime.104 
In reaching its conclusion, the BIA reviewed both the federal circuit court 
of appeals’ crime of violence decisions and the legislative history of 18 
U.S.C. § 16. Through its review, the BIA determined that, in resolving crime 
of violence issues, a categorical approach that focuses on statutory definitions 
rather than the underlying circumstances of the crime must be used.105 
Furthermore, in determining whether a substantial risk existed, the 
defendant’s conduct, not the consequences of the crime are relevant.106 
Specifically, the BIA indicated, “‘the use of physical force’ is an act 
committed by a criminal defendant, while ‘the risk of physical injury’ is a 
consequence of the defendant’s acts.”107 In addition, the use of force must be 
intentional, not volitional.108 Thus, for the BIA to find an alien committed a 
crime of violence, his conviction must be based on a statute that requires both 
recklessness and a substantial risk that force will be used in committing the 
crime.109 
Second, the BIA specifically addressed Luis Manuel Ramos’ 
deportation.110 After reviewing the Massachusetts General Law under which 
Ramos was convicted, the BIA determined that his conviction was not based 
on an crime that, “by its nature, involve[d] a substantial risk that the 
perpetrator may use force against the person . . . to carry out the particular 
offense.”111 According to the BIA’s analysis, while there may be a risk that 
driving drunk will result in an accident, the Massachusetts law did not 
require that Ramos intentionally or volitionally use force against another to 
be convicted.112 In addition, the law did not require that Ramos actually 
cause an accident while driving drunk.113 Thus, because the use of a 
substantial risk of force was not a requirement for a conviction under the 
Massachusetts law, the BIA vacated Ramos’ deportation order.114 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Luis Manuel Ramos, a native and citizen of Portugal, became a United States resident in 
1969. Id. On March 22, 2002, he was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor and sentenced to a two year prison sentence. Id. On April 28, 2002, based on 
Ramos’ conviction for a crime of violence, the INS began removal proceedings. Id. The Immigration 
Judge found Ramos removable, and Ramos appealed. Id. The BIA affirmed the removal order. Id. 
Ramos then moved for reconsideration. Id. 
 111. Id.  
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. Drunk Driving—Attitudes & Punishment 
In the United States, drinking and driving is one of the most common 
crimes committed, charged, and adjudicated.115 Although states punish 
convicted drunk drivers differently, the penalties have increased 
nationwide.116 Public perception of drinking and driving has also shifted.117 
The National Highway Traffic Administration regularly conducts a 
nationwide survey of attitudes toward drinking and driving which reveals an 
increasing American awareness of the consequences of a DUI conviction.118 
Many courts and administrative agencies, including the BIA,119 have 
recognized the issue’s seriousness. Commenting on the impact of driving 
under the influence, the United States Supreme Court stated, “drunk drivers 
cause an annual death toll of over 25,000 and in the same time span cause 
nearly one million personal injuries and more than five billion dollars in 
damage.”120 While it would be inappropriate to decide drunk driving does not 
 115. Rebecca Snyder Bromley, Jury Leniency in Drinking and Driving Cases Has it Changed? 
1958 Versus 1993, 20 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 27, 29 (1996). 
 116. Id. at 30. Conceding to pressure from the federal government, all states have raised their 
minimum drinking age to twenty-one. Id. Possible drunk driving penalties include mandatory jail 
sentences, steep fines, license revocation, and mandatory attendance at alcohol education and 
treatment classes. Id. at 31. Under certain circumstances, civil liability has also been imposed against 
both tavern owners and social hosts. Id. 
 117. Id. at 32. “The formation of organizations such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving, Remove 
Intoxicated Drivers, and Students Against Drunk Driving in the 1980s ushered in an era of high-level 
media publicity” which created a “public climate of moral opprobrium.” Id. Despite the increased 
media attention regarding dangers inherent in drunk driving, the majority of the American public 
continues to have an inconsistent attitude regarding drinking and driving. Id. In some instances, 
individuals are sympathetic to drunk drivers, believing: “There, but for the grace of God, go I.” Id. 
Furthermore, the “American culture is very intertwined with the automobile and also has a generally 
tolerant attitude towards alcohol, unlike most other drugs.” Id. at 33. While most Americans remain 
conflicted in their attitudes toward drinking and driving, the level of alcohol consumed continues to 
increase. Id. at 35. 
 118. National Highway Traffic Administration, National Survey of Drinking and Driving Attitudes 
and Behavior: 1995: Part III (1995), at http://www.ncadd.com/tsra/abstracts/0.11html. The 1995 
survey revealed that nine out of ten people believe that it is likely that they would receive some sort of 
punishment if they were stopped for drinking and driving. Id. Additionally, three-fourths of the driving 
public believes that the punishment would be severe. Id. Furthermore, most people think that first time 
offenders should receive license suspension or revocation and a fine. Id. For repeat offenders, sixty 
percent of the driving age public recommend license suspension and revocation, and forty-five percent 
recommend jail time. Id. 
 119. See In re Magallanes-Garcia, 1998 WL 133301, at *1; Michigan State Police v. Sitz, 496 
U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (quoting 4 W. LaFave, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 10.8(d), at 71 (2d ed. 1987)); Rutherford, 54 F.3d at 375-77. 
 120. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451 (quoting 4 W. LaFave, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.8(d), at 71 (2d ed. 1987)).  
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constitute a crime of violence because deciding otherwise would have serious 
deportation consequences for convicted aliens, the public policy 
ramifications should be considered.121 It is inequitable to impose a harsher 
penalty against an alien than an American when both individuals have 
committed substantively the same crime.122 
In punishing aliens convicted of drunk driving, courts have taken two 
basic approaches to analyzing whether drunk driving constitutes a crime of 
violence.123 Generally, the courts agree that the categorical approach is the 
correct method to use in analyzing the issue.124 However, the circuits 
applying the categorical approach have viewed the issue from different 
perspectives. In reaching their conclusions, the circuits holding that drunk 
driving does not constitute a crime of violence have focused on the “use” 
language of 18 U.S.C. § 16 and asserted that, in order to be convicted of 
drunk driving, a defendant does not have to intend to use force.125 Because of 
 121. See Three Times and Out—Some Face Deportation for Repeat Drunken Driving, supra note 
1; see also Future Depends on Ruling: Deportations for 3 DWIs May be Halted, supra note 7. If aliens 
with multiple drunk driving convictions are deported, family ties will be severed. Id. In addition, many 
families will be forced to seek public subsidies to survive. Id. 
 122. While many aliens with multiple drunk driving convictions face deportation, Americans 
convicted of drunk driving often face far more lenient punishment. Andy Rose, Judge’s Arrest Not 
Expected to Affect Post, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1997, at B1. In Ventura, California, Superior Court 
Judge Robert C. Bradley was arrested for drunk driving. Id. Following his arrest, Judge Bradley was 
taken to the County Jail and given a blood alcohol level test. Id. The test showed his blood alcohol 
level to be 0.21, which is more than twice the legal limit. Id. Rather than keep Judge Bradley in jail 
overnight, California Highway Patrol officials drove him home. Id. Historically, judges charged with 
drunk driving have faced “action ranging from private censure to public reprimand.” Id. If Judge 
Bradley should decide to plead guilty or is convicted, he faces a $2,000 fine. Id. He could also serve up 
to “48-hours in jail or five days of work release as well as enrollment in a school for drinking drivers.” 
Id. Clearly, the penalties faced by Judge Bradley are far less severe in comparison to those faced by 
aliens. As an officer of the court, Judge Bradley should have a comprehensive understanding of drunk 
driving laws and the consequences of breaking those laws. However, he is held to a lower standard 
than aliens who may not understand the American judicial system or the consequences of a guilty plea. 
See supra note 10.  
 123. Courts that hold drunk driving does not constitute a crime of violence generally follow the 
categorical approach. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d at 200; Parsons, 955 F.2d at 858; Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 
921; Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 600; Park, 252 F.3d at 1018; Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1140. When 
applying the categorical approach, the proper inquiry requires consideration of whether a particular 
defined offense, in the abstract is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 
at 921. Conversely, courts finding drunk driving constitutes a crime of violence have also applied the 
categorical approach, but focus on the likelihood that bodily harm will result during the commission of 
the crime in conducting their analysis. Tapia-Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1216; Le, 196 F.3d at 1352. Because 
there is a “well-documented danger inherent in drunk driving,” the generic elements of the offense 
present a “substantial risk that physical force may be used.” Tapia-Garcia, 237 F.3d. at 1223. 
 124. Dalton, 257 F.3d at 200; Parsons, 955 F.2d at 858; Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 921; Bazan-
Reyes, 256 F.3d at 600; Park, 252 F.3d at 1018; Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1140; Tapia Garcia, 
237 F.3d at 1216. 
 125. See Dalton, 257 F.3d at 200; Parsons, 955 F.2d at 858; Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 921; 
Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 600; Park, 252 F.3d at 1018; Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1140. 
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the inherent nature of the crime of drunk driving, it would be illogical to state 
that those individuals who drive drunk intend to cause serious bodily injury 
to others.126 While their actions might result in the infliction of serious bodily 
injury upon others, it seems ludicrous to suggest that the “average” 
intoxicated driver gets behind the wheel with an intention to harm others.127 
However, the circuits holding drunk driving constitutes a crime of violence128 
argue that the act of driving while intoxicated poses an inherent risk of death 
or serious bodily harm,129 thereby meeting the definition of crime of violence 
in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).130 
Even if drunk driving is not classified as a crime of violence for purposes 
of 18 U.S.C. § 16, both aliens and Americans alike are subject to severe 
punishment.131 Therefore, a decision holding that drunk driving does not 
constitute a crime of violence would not render drunk drivers immune to 
punishment.132 Instead, deportation would simply be eliminated as a potential 
penalty for aliens repeatedly convicted of drunk driving. When considered in 
conjunction with the dire effects of deportation and the availability of 
alternate penalties, classification of drunk driving as a crime of violence 
 126. Id. 
 127. In attempting to explain why he drives drunk, Willie C. Mosely, a 60-year old Alabama 
native serving a sentence for his second conviction for DUI murder, stated: 
Most of the time when you drink, you ain’t hardly satisfied, and you’ll be wanting to go 
somewhere and do something when you ain’t got no business doing it. At the time, you don’t be 
thinking because you just say I’ll run right over here and run right back and ain’t nothing going to 
happen. But it really just don’t pay to go. 
T. Brad Bishop, Drinking and Driving in Alabama: The Facts, The Laws and Possible Solutions, 
ALABAMA LAWYER, Sept. 1998, at 304. 
 128. Tapia Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1216; Le, 196 F.3d at 1352. 
 129. In Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370 (7th Cir. 1995), the court addressed the likelihood that driving 
drunk will result in death or serious bodily injury, stating: 
The dangers of drunk driving are well-known and well documented. Unlike other acts that may 
present some risk of physical injury, such as pick pocketing . . . or perhaps child neglect or certain 
environmental crimes like the mishandling of hazardous wastes or pollutants, the risk of injury 
from drunk driving is neither conjectural or speculative. Driving under the influence vastly 
increases the probability that the driver will injure someone in an accident. Out of the more than 
34,000 fatal traffic accidents in 1992, 36.1 percent involved a driver with a blood alcohol 
concentration . . . over .10 percent and another 9 percent with a BAC of between .01 and .09 
percent. 
Id at 376. 
 130. 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2001) defines as a crime of violence “any other offense that is a felony 
and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of 
another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” 
 131. See supra note 118. 
 132. Although convicted defendants no longer face deportation, they will still be sentenced for 
their crimes. Bromley, supra note 115, at 31 (1996). Possible sentencing options include license 
revocation, jail time, mandatory alcohol treatment, and potential societal censure or any combination 
thereof. Id. 
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seems excessive. 
Although no solution will be perfect, it seems essential that the issue of 
classifying drunk driving be resolved expediently. Based on the number of 
circuit court and BIA opinions drafted on the issue in the last two years, the 
issue clearly needs to be resolved both to provide clarity to the courts and 
also to provide notice to aliens who risk deportation when they choose to 
drive under the influence.133 
IV. RESOLUTION 
In order to resolve the split among the circuits and the Board of 
Immigration appeals, Congress should amend 18 U.S.C. § 16 to include the 
mental states required for the commission of a crime of violence, specifically 
excluding crimes like drunk driving which do not involve the intentional use 
of force. In addition, a comprehensive legislative history discussing the 
rationale behind Congress’s choice to amend the statute would also prove 
invaluable to courts and administrative agencies charged with interpreting 18 
U.S.C. § 16. Not only would Congress’s action expediently resolve the 
current problem involving the classification of drunk driving, but this would 
also address any future problems that may develop in classifying other 
“crimes of violence.” 
Lauren K. Lofton 
 
 
 133. In combating drunk driving, public awareness of the penalties associated with DWI arrests 
has been found to be especially important in effective enforcement, deterrence and sanctioning. 
http://www.ncadd.com/tsra/abstracts/legal.html. 
  B.A. (1996), University of Wisconsin. J.D. (2003), Washington University School of Law. I 
would like to thank Sharon Corsentino for her invaluable topic selection advice and my family for 
their ever-enduring support. 
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